Introduction
In 1958, the UK Ministry of Supply found that, on average, actual costs of defence equipment were 2.8 times those forecast.
1 In 1965, the TSR-2 was cancelled partly because of costs rising from the original £500 million to over £1000 million and possibly as high as £2000 million. In 1998, the cost overrun on Euro®ghter was forecast to be around £1.5 billion. There are two other problems aside from cost overruns. Time slippage is endemic to UK's procurement system and averages around three and a half years, though some projects have slipped ten years and others even more.
2 Meeting performance speci®cations has also been poor with around 10 per cent of key technical requirements not met. It seems that little has changed.
In actual fact, a great deal has changed. Repeated studies over the years have made many recommendations, and consequent changes in organization, process and methods of overview have been extensive, ranging from the creation of a radically improved procurement process in 1961 (modi®ed in 1968) to the formation of a Procurement Executive in 1971, and the adoption of competitive, ®xed price contracts in 1985. But these changes have had only moderate success. Why? The answer is that some of the key recommendations were never implemented and others were only partially, and often half-heartedly, enforced. The ideas were good, their adoption ¯awed. Later studies, including Options for Change (1991) and the Defence Costs Study (1994) had little impact on procurement and it was not until the new Labour government was formed in 1997 that the ills of procurement took centre stage along with the more traditional top-of-the-bill subjects such as dockyards, the Territorial Army, strategic deployability and joint or Def operations. In July 1997, the Secretary of State f ence, George Robertson, launched `Smart Procurement': I am therefore launching a major initiative to try and eliminate the kind of cost overruns and delays that have characterised some equipment projects in the past . . . by spreading best practice and learning from experience at home and abroad . . . so we are looking for `smart procurement '. 3 What was new this time was that the examination of procurement ills was not going to be speci®cally a cost reduction exercise to plug shortfalls in the budget. It was of course about saving money through increased ef®ciency, but it was to be more fundamental than that. There was a whiff of revolution:
By discarding old practices which are no longer appropriate and learning from successful innovation in industry, we have identi®ed new ways of working and a new support organisation. As a result we are making radical changes . . .
4
Shortly afterwards an even clearer clarion call: `A revolution . . . a complete cultural change in Ministry of Defence procurement '. 5 Revolution was in the air. Would it succeed or would it ®zzle out like so many of the earlier initiatives? The purpose of this chapter is to explore the issues, and critically evaluate progress in the UK's procurement `revolution'.
The fundamental issues
What was wrong had been clear for many years, at least to those with eyes to see, and ears to hear. The problems may be listed as:
. lack of accountability, with a mismatch between the delegation of responsibility and that of authority.
. widespread amateurism caused by a lack of the right personal qualities, expertise and training.
. ineffective and time-wasting scrutiny.
. convoluted procedures with a committee-consensus culture. . compromise, delay and weakness in decision making. These weaknesses were con®rmed when MOD brought in McKinsey and Company to identify procurement ills and, based on this, recommended a number of initiatives including:
